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ABSTRACT
With the rapid development of GPS enabled devices (smart-
phones) and location-based applications, location privacy is in-
creasingly concerned. Intuitively, it is widely believed that location
privacy can be preserved by publishing aggregated mobility data,
such as the number of users in an area at some time. However, a
recent attack shows that these aggregated mobility data can be
exploited to recover individual trajectories. In this paper, we first
propose two differentially private basic schemes for aggregated
mobility data publication, namely direct perturbation and threshold
perturbation, which preserve location privacy of users and espe-
cially resist the trajectory recovery attack. Then, we explore the
moving characteristics of mobile users, and design an improved
scheme named static hybrid perturbation by combining the two
basic schemes according to the moving characteristics. Since static
hybrid perturbation works only for static data, which are entirely
available before publishing, we further adapt the static hybrid per-
turbation by combining it with linear regression, and yield another
improved scheme named dynamic hybrid perturbation. The dy-
namic hybrid perturbation works also for dynamic data, which are
generated on the fly during publication. Privacy analysis shows
that the proposed schemes achieve differential privacy. Extensive
experiments on both simulated and real datasets demonstrate that
all proposed schemes resist the trajectory recovery attack well, and
the improved schemes significantly outperform the basic schemes.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections;
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the development of wireless communication and mobile
positioning technologies, a growing number of mobile devices have
been equipped with GPS precise positioning functions. This change
makes location-based service (LBS) become increasingly popular,
which is one of the most promising services for mobile users. LBS
refers to the services providing information and entertainment to
mobile users based on geographic locations and other information
in mobile devices [14]. It has been widely used in military, gov-
ernment industry, commerce, medical, emergency, and people’s
livelihood [30]. Some typical applications include map applications
and GPS navigation (e.g., Google Maps), coupons or discount offers
(e.g., MeiTuan), social communications (e.g., WeChat). However,
while bringing huge benefits to individuals and society, LBS has
also aroused serious privacy concerns.
When users access to LBS, they need to report their locations,
which can be used to infer sensitive personal information, such as
home addresses, living habits, health status and social relations,
etc. Therefore, the disclosure of location information to untrusted
third parties (e.g., LBS providers) will possibly lead to the abuse
of personal data, and produce serious risks to user privacy. For
example, according to the anonymous GPS data, one can infer an
individual’s home address, work unit and social relationships, and
can predict the user’s past, present and future locations, track an
individual’s whereabouts. Even indoor location information can be
used to infer an individual’s job role, age, hobbies (smoking or not),
etc. Therefore, the protection of users’ location privacy is a crucial
issue [28].
Previously, many schemes have been proposed to protect user
location privacy in LBS. For example, Niu et al [19] applied k-
anonymity to the data publication in LBS, such that personal pri-
vacy cannot be identified by attackers. Wang et al [24] replaced
usernames in LBS queries with temporary pseudonyms to break the
link between a user’s identity and its queries. In order to hide users’
real locations, Niu et al [20] proposed to achieve user anonymity by
generating dummy locations, and using virtual locations instead of
real locations. In addition, some other works proposed to solve the
privacy problem in the LBS through the trajectory generalization
process [9], or based on encryption methods [21].
Although people have made great efforts and contributions
to the privacy protection for LBS users, new privacy problems are
still emerging. The recent work [25] argued that user privacy is
not preserved in aggregated mobility data. They designed an attack
that recovers individual trajectories from the aggregated mobility
data without any prior knowledge by exploiting the uniqueness
and regularity of human mobility. The accuracy of the recovered
trajectories is between 73% and 91%. This is a fatal blow to LBS
providers (mobile operators) that have published aggregated data.
They were intuitively convinced that sorely the aggregated data
could not reveal any privacy information of individual users, but
now it becomes a serious privacy problem.
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Differential privacy [5] has been widely accepted as a standard
for privacy protection. This technique has been developed in a series
of articles [1, 4, 7] and finally taken sharp in [6]. This technology can
achieve any level of privacy protection, and intuitively it captures
the increased risks of privacy breaches. In many cases, it can ensure
a high level of privacy protection, as well as the sufficient accuracy
of the database information. Differential privacy has been widely
used in data publishing and data mining [16]. Especially in the
privacy protection of aggregated statistics [11, 13, 15, 23, 29], it
elegantly bounds the knowledge gain of an adversary whether a
user opts in or out of a dataset.
In this paper, we propose differentially private schemes for
perturbing and publishing mobile aggregated data. By analyzing
the distribution of users at different times in cities [12, 22], we find
the moving characteristics of urban users as follows. During the
daytime, users usually appear in several locations and move fre-
quently, resulting in large L1 distances of aggregated mobility data
at adjacent time-stamps. However, in the nighttime, users are often
near homes, or even in static states, causing that the L1 distances
are relatively small. In our schemes, we divide a day into daytime
and nighttime two periods accordingly with differential privacy.
In the daytime period when the data change rapidly, we add noise
directly to the aggregated mobility data with Laplace mechanism.
In the nighttime period when the data change slowly, we compare
the changes with a threshold and add Laplace noise to the data
accordingly. Furthermore, after perturbing the aggregated mobility
data, we design a post-processing mechanism to process the noise
data, which greatly improves the data utility. The contribution of
this paper can be summarized as follows:
• To our knowledge, we are the first to design a differentially
private scheme for aggregated mobility data publication, and en-
hance the design by taking advantage of moving characteristics
of mobile users. Previous work mainly applies differential privacy
to common aggregated data publication without considering the
application-specific characteristics of data.
• For static data publication, we design the static hybrid pertur-
bation mechanism based on users’ moving characteristics, adopting
different perturbation methods in different time periods of a day.
Moreover, we design a post-processing mechanism to smooth the
noise data, improving the data utility.
• For dynamic data publication, we design the dynamic hy-
brid perturbation by combining the static hybrid perturbation with
learning and prediction, such that the mechanism first learns from
the historical data, and then predicts for the current data accord-
ingly.
•We fully implement our scheme, and evaluate it based on
both simulated and real datasets. Experimental results show that our
scheme provides strong privacy protection against the trajectory
recovery attack, and ensures the utility of data as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
related work is introduced. In Section 3, the preliminaries are given.
Section 4 is the system model. We elaborate on the basic schemes
in Section 5 and the improved schemes in Section 6. We include
the detailed experimental evaluation of the proposed schemes in
Section 7 and make conclusions in Section 8.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review the related work of location privacy
from the following aspects.
Traditional Protection. There exist various traditional tech-
niques for protecting users’ locations or trajectories. Niu et al. [19]
adopted the k-anonymity to protect users’ location privacy by pre-
venting identification. Papers [24] and [20] ensured location privacy
by pseudonym replacement and dummy location generation, re-
spectively. Stefanakis [9] protected users’ movement trajectories by
a trajectory generalization technique. Schlegel et al. [21] proposed
dynamic grid system to preserve users’ trajectory privacy. These
methods for location privacy protection normally based an ad hoc
basis, lacking of a rigorous mathematical foundation. It is indicated
that an adversary can still obtain sensitive information of users
through some background knowledge, auxiliary information, and
the like [25]. Different from this, our work leverages the notion of
differential privacy, which is of rigorous theoretical foundations,
and can rule out background knowledge attacks.
DP-based Protection. Differential privacy (DP) has been
widely applied to location privacy protection. Here, we only re-
view the most recent works for data release, which are relevant
to our work. Fan et al. [11] proposed a real-time aggregated data
release scheme at event-level, FAST, by comparing the error be-
tween a prior estimate and a posterior one of perturbed data, and
then conducting an adaptive sampling and perturbation. However,
FAST must pre-assign the maximum times of publications and the
privacy budget of each sampling point. For infinite stream data
publication, Kellaris et al. [13] proposed aw-event privacy frame-
work, protecting any event sequence occurring within any sliding
window ofw time stamps. Whenw = 1, this scheme degrades into
an aggregated data publication at event-level like [11]. Li et al. [15]
proposed publication schemes for dynamic datasets with differ-
ential privacy. They calculated distances of data at adjacent time
stamps, and determined whether to release a new perturbation or
an old one by comparing with a threshold. These works have well
addressed the location privacy protection for various data release
issues. However, to enhance the data utility, they only considered
the common features of data, while did not take into account the
application-specific features of data.
Location Characterization. There are some works captur-
ing the characteristics of people’s locations. According to [12, 22],
the mobile patterns of human beings during every day are quite
regular. Activities are most frequent during the daytime, followed
by the evening, and lest frequent at midnight. Literatures [2, 3]
analyzed the temporal and spatial characteristics of urban popu-
lation, showing the time durations of stays in the nighttime are
significantly longer than those in the daytime. These location char-
acteristics have been exploited to launch a location privacy attack.
For instance, Xu et al. [25] designed an attack method that accu-
rately recovers the trajectories of users based on aggregated location
data using the location characteristics of human beings. This attack
has also taught us a lesson that even aggregated data reveal users’
privacy. We have used the location characteristics of users in our
work, and different from literature [25], we use them to improve
the data utility while protecting the location privacy.
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3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the notion of differential
privacy and the technique of linear regression.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) ensures a similar function output of
a dataset no matter a user’s personal information is in or out of the
dataset. The formal definition can be described as follows.
Definition 3.1. (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY)[5] A randomized
mechanismM: D → O satisfies ϵ-DP, where ϵ ≥ 0, if for all sets
O ⊆ O, and every pair D,D ′ ∈ D of neighboring databases, we
have
Pr [M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eϵ · Pr [M(D ′) ∈ O] (1)
Differential privacy can be achieved by adding an appropriate
amount of interference noise to the return value of a query function.
Adding too much noise will affect the utility of the results, while
too small noise will not suffice the privacy guarantee. Sensitivity is
the key parameter that determines what amount of noise should
be added. It refers to the maximum amount of change caused by
deleting a record in the worst case.
Definition 3.2 (Global Sensitivity [8]). LetD andD ′ denote any
pair of neighboring databases. The global sensitivity of a function
f , denoted by ∆f , is given as below
∆f = max
D,D′
| f (D) − f (D ′)| (2)
Differential privacy has post-processing property, as stated in
Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3 (Post-processing [8]). Given a randomizedmech-
anism M1 that satisfies ϵ-DP, then for any randomized algorithm
M2, the compositionM2(M1) still satisfies ϵ-DP.
For sequential composition and parallel composition, differen-
tial privacy can be guaranteed by Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5,
respectively.
Theorem 3.4 (Seqential Composition [16]). LetM1, ...,Mr
be a set of mechanisms, whereMi provides ϵi -DP. LetM be another
mechanism that executes M1(D), cdots , Mr (D) using independent
randomness for each Mi , and returns the vector of the outputs of
these mechanisms. Then,M satisfies(Σri=1ϵi )-DP.
Theorem 3.5 (Parallel Composition [16]). LetM1, · · · ,Mk
be k mechanisms that satisfy ϵ1-DP, . . ., ϵk -DP, respectively. For a
deterministic partitioning function f , let D1, ...,Dk be respectively
the resulting partitions of excuting f on dataset D. Publishing the
results ofM1(D1), . . . ,Mk (Dk ) satisfies (maxi ∈[1, ...,k ] ϵi )-DP.
In practice, there are different methods to achieve DP. The
Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism [5, 16, 17] are
two basic mechanisms. The Laplace mechanism is suitable for the
protection of numerical results, and the exponential mechanism is
also suitable for the protection of non-numeric results.
Laplace Mechanism. The Laplace mechanism implements ϵ-
DP by adding random noise following the Laplace distribution to
query results, as described in Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.6. For any function f : D → Rd , the mechanism
M
M(D) = f (D) + Lap(∆f /ϵ) (3)
gives ϵ-DP.
Here, Lap(b) represents the Laplace distribution with a scale
parameter b, and the corresponding probability density function is
as follows.
p(x) = 12b exp(−
|x |
b
) (4)
In many practical applications, the query results may be non-
numeric (such as a scheme or a choice). In this regard, McSherry et
al. [17] proposed the exponential mechanism.
Exponential Mechanism. Let the output range of the mecha-
nismM be R, q(D, r ) be the utility function used to evaluate the
pros and cons of the output r ∈ R, the exponential mechanism is
as follows.
Theorem 3.7. Given a utility function q : (D × R) → R for a
database D ∈ D, the mechanismM,
M(D,q) = {return r with probility ∝ exp(ϵq(D, r )2∆q )} (5)
gives ϵ-DP, where ∆q is the sensitivity of function q, and is defined
as
∆q = max
r ∈R
max
D1,D2
|q(D1, r ) − q(D2, r )| (6)
where D1 and D2 are any pair of neighboring databases.
3.2 Linear Regression
Linear regression [10] is one of the most basic methods of
machine learning [18]. It is a linear model that makes predictions
through a linear combination of attributes. It aims to find a line or a
plane or a higher-dimensional hyperplane that minimizes the error
between predicted values and real values. The results obtained by
linear regression are well interpretable and the calculation entropy
is not complicated. Linear regression can be divided into unitary
regression and multiple regression. Unitary regression means that
there is only one impact factor, and a familiar linear equation is
involved. For multiple regression, there are multiple impact factors.
In this paper, we use unitary regression to make predictions.
Hypothesis Function. The purpose of regression is to predict
the target value of another numerical data from several known
data. It is assumed that the features and results satisfy a linear
relationship (taking the formula hθ (x) = θ0 + θ1x as an example
in the following). This relationship is called regression equation,
and it is a mathematical model chosen to fit some of the data given
already.
Cost Function. Through the linear regression algorithm, we
may get a lot of linear regression models, but different models have
different abilities to fit the data. We need to find a linear regression
model that best describes the relationship between the data. The
cost function is used to describe the difference between the linear
regression model and the real data. If there is no difference at all,
the linear regression model fully describes the data relationship. If
we need to find the best fitting linear regression model, we need to
minimize the corresponding cost function. And it usually defined
as J (θ0,θ1) = 12n
∑n
i=0(hθ (xi ) − yi )2
3
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Figure 1: System Model
Gradient Decent. In order to find the optimal hypothesis func-
tion parameters, the goal is to make the cost function take the
smallest value. Gradient descent can help us find the local mini-
mum point of a function. It can be used not only in linear regression
model, but also in many other machine learning models. The idea is
as follows: (1) initialization parameters θ0 and θ1; (2) continuously
update their values at the same time to make them smaller, and
finally find the minimum value point of J (θ0,θ1).
4 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we formally describe the problem definition and
the attack model, and then especially review the attack proposed
in [25].
4.1 Problem Definition
Fig. 1 shows the system model. In this model, we letM denote
the number of base stations in a city, and N represent the total
number of mobile users which are covered by all base stations
in a city. At time stamp ti , let uim denote the number of mobile
users at the mth base station, and let l in denote the base station
where the nth user is located. We define an aggregated mobility
dataset as D = {Di }Si=1, and Di = {ui1,ui2, ...,uiM } representing
the histogram for numbers of mobile users in all base stations at
time stamp ti . Without loss of generality, we assume that the time
duration for data publications is a day. It is obvious to extend the
time duration to any length. For each time stamp ti , we need to
release a private aggregated dataset D˜i . And finally, we need to
release a noisy version D˜ for the dataD. We summarize all notations
used in this paper in Table 1.
4.2 Attack Model
We assume that the service provider is trustable, and it car-
ries out the data publication process honestly. Also, the service
provider is responsible for doing its best to protect users’ location
privacy. The data then release to some data consumers, which may
be adversaries. We assume that the adversaries have not any prior
information of the targeted data. They do their best to analyze
Notation Descriptioin
D Original aggregated dataset
D′ Neighboring dataset
D˜ DP aggregated dataset
Di Original aggregated dataset at time point ti
D˜i DP aggregated dataset at time point ti
M Number of base stations
N Number of mobile users
uim
Number of mobile users at themth base station
at time point ti
l in
Base station location of the nth user
at time point ti
ϵ Total privacy budget
S Number of time stamps
ϵ1 Privacy budget for comparing with threshold
ϵ2 Privacy budget for perturbaing with threshold
ϵl Left privacy budget during threshold perturbation
T threshold
ϵs Privacy budget for time division
ϵd Privacy budget for direct perturbation
ϵt Privacy budget for threshold perturbation
tˆ1 the first time division point
tˆ2 the second time division point
Table 1: notations
the data released, and try to infer as much as possible location
information of single mobile users.
Under this attack model, literature [25] has proposed an attack
method based on the regularity and uniqueness of mobile users’
movements. This attack aims to recover mobile users’ individual
trajectories from the the aggregated mobility data with an unsuper-
vised method. It iteratively associates the same user’s movement
records in adjacent time stamps and gradually recovers the entire
trajectory. In each time stamp, the attack process can be divided
into two steps. Firstly, the possibility that next position l in belongs
to a given trajectory can be estimated by utilizing the characteris-
tics of human mobility. Secondly, an optimal solution is obtained
by the idea of linear sum assignment, so that it can link the mobile
users’ trajectories with the next record of mobility.
5 BASIC SCHEMES
In this section, we propose two basic schemes, the direct per-
turbation scheme based on the Laplace mechanism [5] and the
threshold perturbation scheme based on the sparse vector tech-
nique [5]. We also propose a consistency post-process mechanism,
which can be applied to the basic schemes, as well as the improved
schemes in next section, for preserving the consistency of noisy
aggregated mobility data.
5.1 Direct Perturbation
To publish the aggregated mobility data D = {Di }Si=1 with
ϵ-differential privacy, where Di = {ui1,ui2, ...,uim }, a naive idea is
to perturb the histogram Di at each time stamp ti with the privacy
budget ϵ/S by applying Laplace mechanism. Then, in terms of the
sequential composition theorem, we get a differentially private data
4
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publication scheme as required. Alg. 1 shows the procedure of the
direct perturbation mechanism.
Algorithm 1 Direct Perturbation Mechanism
Input: Dataset D = {Di }Si=1, privacy budget ϵ , histogram sensitiv-
ity ∆H
Output: Noisy dataset D˜ = {D˜i }Si=1
1: Set b = S · ∆H /ϵ ;
2: for i = 0 to S do
3: Generate ni = (ni1,ni2...,nim ) with i.i.d. Lap(b);
4: Set D˜i = Di + ni ;
5: end for
6: return D˜ = {D˜i }Si=1;
Note that in Alg. 1, we regard two aggregated mobility datasets
D and D ′ that differ in only a user’s trajectory as neighboring
sets. More specifically, if D ′ contains the same user trajectories
as D except excluding one, we say D and D ′ are neighboring sets.
According to this definition of neighboring sets, we can compute
the histogram sensitivity ∆H of the direction perturbation is 1.
The direct perturbation mechanism simply achieves differen-
tial privacy. However, as the increase of the number of time stamps
S , the Laplace noise grows larger, and the data utility becomes
worse. The reason is that this perturbation mechanism perturbs the
histogram of each time stamp independently, without considering
the dependences between histograms of adjacent time stamps.
5.2 Threshold Perturbation
An improvement on the naive idea is that, we do not have
to perturb the histogram of very time stamp, but just perturb the
histograms when there are significant changes. It would be a great
waste of privacy budget if the data change little, but they are per-
turbed independently for each time stamp. For this reason, we can
use the threshold perturbation based on the sparse vector technique.
The threshold perturbation has been adapted from [15], and the
sparse vector technique takes the form of that in [8].
Alg. 2 shows the threshold perturbation mechanism. In the
algorithm, we first divide the privacy budget ϵ into two parts, ϵ1
and ϵ2, where the former is for comparing with the threshold and
the latter is for perturbing data (Line 1). Next, the first histogram
D1 is directly perturbed with Lap(c∆/ϵ1) noise (Line 2), the first
noisy threshold T˜1 is set (Line 3), and the count of perturbations
cnt is initialized (Line 4). Then, the algorithm loops to perturb the
data from time stamp 2 to S , repeatedly (Lines 5 to 22). There are
three cases for this loop to deal with. First, when the privacy budget
runs out, all left histograms are released with the last perturbed
one (Lines 6 to 9). Second, if there are some privacy budget left
when perturbing the last histogram, all the left budget ϵl is used to
released the histogram (Lines 10 to 13). Third, in the middle of the
loop, each histogram is released by comparing a noisy distance and
a noisy threshold, and the noisy histogram can be a newly perturbed
one or the previously perturbed one accordingly (Lines 14 to 21).
Here, the thresholdT is a fixed value determined by the distribution
of users at different time stamps.
The threshold perturbation mechanism considers the data de-
pendences between histograms at adjacent time stamps. Specifically,
Algorithm 2 Threshold Perturbation Mechanism
Input: Dataset D = {Di }Si=1, privacy budget ϵ , threshold T , distance
sensitivity ∆D , cutoff point c
Output: Noisy dataset D˜ = {D˜i }Si=1
1: Set ϵ1 = αϵ , ϵ2 = (1 − α )ϵ ;
2: Perturb D1 with Lap(c∆D/ϵ2) and get D˜1;
3: Set T˜1 = T + Lap(c∆D/ϵ1);
4: Set cnt = 1;
5: for i = 2 to S do
6: if cnt ≥ c then
7: Set D˜i = D˜i−1;
8: continue;
9: end if
10: if i == S then
11: Perturb DS with Lap(∆D/ϵl ) and get D˜S ;
12: continue;
13: end if
14: Set d˜i = Dist(D˜i−1, Di ) + Lap( 2c∆Dϵ1 );
15: if d˜i ≥ T˜cnt then
16: Perturb Di with Lap(c∆D/ϵ2) and get D˜i ;
17: Set cnt = cnt + 1;
18: Set T˜cnt = T + Lap(c∆D/ϵ1);
19: else
20: Set D˜i = D˜i−1;
21: end if
22: end for
23: return D˜ ;
it uses the previous noisy histogram as the release of the current
original histogram if there are only small changes. Therefore, if
there is adequate data dependence, this mechanism can greatly re-
duce the use of privacy budget, and thus improve the performance
of data publication. Note that we can compute ∆D = 2 due to the
definition of our neighboring sets.
5.3 Consistency Post-processing
After perturbation, the released values may be fractional or
negative. In order to preserve the validity of the data, we design
a consistency post-processing mechanism. The mechanism deals
with the noisy data D˜, meeting the two following conditions: (a)
the value of each element is a non-negative integer, (b) the total
numbers of users after post-processing remains the same as that of
the perturbed data. This processing also has the impact that it can
reduce the error caused by the introduction of noise and improve
the data utility. We detail how to implement the consistency post-
process mechanism in Alg. 3.
In Alg. 3, the algorithm first rounds the value of each element
of noisy data D˜ to an integer (Line 1). Then a FOR loop is executed to
do the post-processing for the histograms of all time stamps (Lines 2
to 17). The loop first sets all negative values of the histogram of the
current time stamp to 0, and then make appropriate adjustments to
other positive values, such that the sum of each noisy histogram
remains the same.
We can show that the post-processing mechanism improves
the data utility. Equivalently, we show that the post-processing
reduces the L1 distance between a noisy histogram and its original
one. First, it is obvious that the rounding has no impact upon the
5
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Algorithm 3 Consistency Post-process Mechanism
Input: Noisy dataset before post-processing D˜
Output: Noisy dataset after post-processing D˜
1: Set D˜ = round(D˜);
2: for i = 1 to S do
3: Set cnt = 0;
4: for j = 1 toM do
5: if u˜ij < 0 then
6: Set cnt = cnt + |u˜ij |;
7: Set u˜ij = 0;
8: end if
9: end for
10: while cnt > 0 and |D˜i | > 0 do
11: Find j ∈R {1, 2, · · · ,M};
12: if u˜ij > 0 then
13: Set u˜ij = u˜
i
j − 1;
14: Set cnt = cnt − 1;
15: end if
16: end while
17: end for
18: return D˜
distance on average. Second, the non-negative processing reduces
the distance. The reason is as follows. We keep the sum of the
noisy histogram the same before and after post-processing, and
the change from negatives to zeros reduces the distance, while the
decrease for positives has the same possibility (i.e., 1/2) to reduce
and increase the distance. Thus, on average, the distance is reduced
and the data utility is improved.
6 IMPROVED SCHEMES
In this section, we first analyze the moving characteristics
of mobile users based on the aggregated mobility data. Then, we
improve the basic schemes by combining them according to the
moving characteristics, and design the static and dynamic hybrid
perturbation mechanisms for static and dynamic data publications,
respectively. Finally, we analyze the privacy of both schemes.
6.1 Characteristic Analysis
Literatures [2, 3] give a detailed analysis of temporal and spa-
tial characteristics of urban population group activities: at different
periods of a day, there are remarkable differences in the duration
of time that users stay in certain locations. Specifically, the dura-
tions of stays in the nighttime are significantly longer than those
in the daytime. That is, people are moving more frequently in the
daytime. In Fig. 2, we analyze two datasets used in our experiments
by computing and plotting the L1 distances between histograms at
adjacent time stamps in a day. The distance values represent the
moving frequencies of mobile users. We found that the two datasets
roughly accord with the reported moving characteristics of human
beings. Specifically, during the daytime, the distances of data are
large, and so is their variation. Conversely, during the night time,
the distances and their variation are small.
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(b) Taxi Dataset
Figure 2: The Distances at Adjacent Time stamps on Two
Dataset
We already know that using direct perturbation to inject noise
directly into the data at each time stamp may lead to a poor utility,
since the data dependence is not considered. Though the threshold
perturbation can improve the data utility if there is adequate data
dependence, it may also suffer a loss of data utility if there is little
data dependence. The reason is that the threshold perturbation
mechanism needs to compare distances and a threshold with dif-
ferential privacy before publishing a histogram with a previous or
a new noisy one, and this consumes extra privacy budget. Then,
if users are moving frequently, and thus the resulted data are of
little dependence, the threshold perturbation mechanism can cause
even worse data utility than the direct perturbation mechanism. On
the other hand, from the analysis of moving characteristics above,
we found that the data of the daytime are of little dependence,
while those of nighttime are of significant one. Therefore, our main
idea is that we can divide the data into daytime and nighttime two
parts, and adopt direct perturbation mechanism for publishing the
daytime part and the threshold perturbation for publishing the
nighttime part, respectively. Fig. 3 shows the framework of the
improved schemes.
6.2 Static Hybrid Perturbation
Based on our main idea, we first design a hybrid perturbation
for static aggregated mobility data, which are entirely obtained
before publication. The main challenge to design the static hybrid
perturbation mechanism is how to divide the data of a day into
daytime and nighttime parts. It is noticeable that a fixed division
does not preserve differential privacy. This can be illustrated by
a critical user, whose trajectory will change the division points
if included. Therefore, we need to perform the data division in a
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Figure 4: A Time Division for Synthetic Dataset
differentially private way, and then perturb each division of data
according to their moving characteristics.
Specifically, the static hybrid perturbation selects two time
division points tˆ1 and tˆ2 through the exponential mechanism, such
that the histograms between these two time stamps change fre-
quently, forming the daytime part of data, and then the mechanism
perturbs the daytime part with direct perturbation, while perturbs
other histograms, which forms the nighttime part of data, with
threshold perturbation. A time division for the synthetic dataset is
illustrated by Fig. 4. Then, the key is to how design a good utility
function that determines how appropriate a pair of time division
points are.
Observing Fig. 2, the selection of time division points should
consider following factors. First, the average distance of histograms
between the two division points should be large, which represents
that the histograms change greatly overall during the selected pe-
riod. Second, the variance of the histograms should be small, in-
dicating that few small distances are included. Third, the length
of the selected time interval should be large enough, otherwise it
is less meaningful for utility improvement. For example, in Fig. 2,
we hope that tˆ1 and tˆ2 fall into the working time (7:00∼10:00) in
the morning and the off duty time (16:00∼19:00) in the afternoon,
respectively. Therefore, we define the utility function as:
U (i, j) = logα (j − i + 1) ×
aveDis
simVar
(7)
where i is the first time division point, j is the second one, and i ≤ j .
The related parts are described as follows.
aveDis: It represents the average of L1 distances between his-
tograms at adjacent time stamps during the time i and j . The larger
the average distance is, the faster the histograms change. There-
fore, the histograms in this time period are more suitable for direct
perturbation. In our context, the average distance aveDis between
time stamps i and j is calculated by
aveDis =
1
j − i + 1
j−1∑
t=i
L1(Dt ,Dt+1) (8)
simVar: It is a variance representing the degree of dispersion
for distances during the time period between i and j. When the
variance is small and the average is large, there are equally large
distances in the period, and this is ideal for the application of direct
disturbance. The calculation of simVar is as follows
simVar =
1
j − i + 1
j−1∑
t=i
|aveDis − L1(Dt ,Dt+1)| (9)
where when i = j or simVar < 0, we simply set simVar = 1.
Parameter α : Sorely considering the two factors mentioned
above does not necessarily result in a reasonable selection of di-
vision points. For instance, when division points i and j are very
close, and the corresponding distances are large, it then leads to that
simVar is small and aveDis is large. Nevertheless, this is not a good
selection for division points, since the time duration is too short.
Therefore, we need another factor logα (j − i + 1) with α > 1 to en-
sure the sufficient length of the selected time interval. Empirically,
α should be set close to the length of the interval.
Sensitivity: The sensitivity of the utility function is 2 logα S ,
where S is the total number of time stamps in a day. The sensitivity
can be calculated as follows. First, the sensitivity of L1 distances
between histograms at adjacent time stamps is at most 2, and hence
the sensitivity of aveDis is also 2. Second, simVar ≥ 1 due to its
definition. Third, its obvious that j − i + 1 ≤ S . To sum up, we get
the sensitivity 2 logα S .
Alg. 4 depicts our static hybrid perturbation mechanism. The
algorithm first divides ϵ into three parts, ϵs , ϵd and ϵt , for time di-
vision, direct perturbation and threshold perturbation, respectively
(Line 1). Then, the utility values of U (i, j) are computed in terms
of Eq. (7) (Line 2), and the division points tˆ1 and tˆ2 are selected by
the exponential mechanism (Lines 3 to 6). That is, we divide the
histograms of a day into daytime part (i.e., the histograms at time
stamps from tˆ1 to tˆ2), and the nighttime part (i.e., other histograms).
Finally, the algorithm publishes the histograms at time stamps from
tˆ1 to tˆ2 with direct perturbation mechanism, while publishes other
histograms with threshold perturbation mechanism.
It is worth noting that static hybrid perturbation is suitable for
the aggregated mobility data which change greatly in some period
of time, and change little other times. This quite accords with the
moving characteristics of human beings in a day.
6.3 Dynamic Hybrid Perturbation
The static hybrid perturbation mechanism only works for
static aggregated mobility data, whose histograms are all available
before publication. Sometimes, we need to publish dynamic data
whose histograms arrive on the fly, and the histograms after the
current time stamp are not available. We propose the dynamic
hybrid perturbation mechanism to deal with this situation.
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Algorithm 4 Static Hybrid Perturbation Mechanism
Input: Dataset D = {Di }Si=1, privacy budget ϵ , threshold T , cutoff
point c , sensitivity ∆
Output: Noisy dataset D˜ = {D˜i }Si=1
1: Divide privacy budget ϵ into ϵs , ϵd and ϵt ;
2: ComputeU (i, j) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ S by Eq. (7);
3: Compute pi j = exp( ϵsU (i, j)2∆ ), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ S ;
4: Normalize {pi, j }i≤j such that ∑i≤j Pi, j = 1;
5: Set Pr = {pi, j }i≤j ;
6: Select (tˆ1, tˆ2) in terms of distribution Pr;
7: Call DirectPerturbation({Di }[tˆ1, tˆ2], ϵd );
8: Call ThresholdPerturbation({Di }[1,S ]\[tˆ1, tˆ2], ϵt , c);
9: return D˜
The main challenge for dynamic hybrid perturbation is how
we can divide the time of a day at the beginning of the publication,
when we do not even know any histogram of the day. The idea
is that we can make use of historical data, and leverage machine
learning techniques to predict the time division. Specifically, we
perform the time division in a differentially private manner for
previous several days based on the historical data, and obtain the
noisy division points, then adopt linear regression to train a model
and predict the time division for the current day. The dynamic
hybrid perturbation mechanism is described in Alg. 5.
Algorithm 5 Dynamic Hybrid Perturbation Mechanism
Input: Historical Data D¯1, D¯2,...,D¯H , current dataset D, budget ϵ ,
threshold T , cutoff points c1, c2, sensitivity ∆
Output: Noisy dataset D˜ = {D˜i }Si=1
1: Divide privacy budget ϵ into ϵd , ϵt1 and ϵt2;
2: for h = 1 to H do
3: Divide time for D¯h and get division points th1 and t
h
2 with
budget ϵ , following Lines 2 to 6 of Alg. 4;
4: end for
5: Perform linear regression based on {th1 , th2 }Hh=1, and predict
division points as tˆ1 and tˆ2 for the current day;
6: Call ThresholdPerturbation({Di }[1, tˆ1−1], ϵt1, c1);
7: Call DirectPerturbation({Di }[tˆ1, tˆ2], ϵd );
8: Call ThresholdPerturbation({Di }[tˆ2+1,S ], ϵt2, c2);
9: return D˜
In Alg. 5, the privacy budget is first divided into three parts,
one for direction perturbation and other two for threshold per-
turbation (Line 1), and the division points for historical data are
computed with differential privacy, following the time division part
of Alg. 4 (Lines 2 to 4). Note that we assume that the historical
data of each past day are independent of one another, and they are
also independent of the current data when computing the historical
time division points. We argue that this is reasonable, since the
information released by the time division is very summary and
it is actually hard to infer the dependence of this information on
any individual. Next, the linear regression is trained based on the
division points of historical data, and the resulted model is used
to predict the time division for the current day (Line 5). Then, the
data of the current day are perturbed with direct perturbation and
threshold perturbation according the time division (Lines 6 to 8).
Now, we sketch the linear regression process as follows. We
first set two hypothesis functions T1 and T2 corresponding to t1
and t2, respectively. The expressions of the hypothesis functionsT1
and T2 are as follows:
T1(x1) = θ01 + θ11x1
T2(x2) = θ02 + θ12x2
Next, we use the least square method to define our cost func-
tions J (θ ). The cost functions are:
J (θ01 ,θ11 ) =
1
2H
H∑
h=1
(T1(x1,h ) − t1,h )2
J (θ02 ,θ12 ) =
1
2H
H∑
h=1
(T2(x2,h ) − t2,h )2
Let θ = (θ0k ,θ1k ), x (i) = (1,xk,i ), and t (i) = tk,i , for k = 1 or 2.
Then, we use gradient descent to iteratively optimize our θ . The
iterative formula of θ is as follows:
θ := θ + β(t (i) −T (x (i)))x (i)
where β is the learning rate.
Finally, we get the trained model and predict the time division
points accordingly.
Note that, the result of linear regression determines the time
division. Therefore, it does not impact on the differential privacy
achieved, but it do impact on the data utility resulted.
6.4 Privacy Analysis
We analyze the privacy of the proposed schemes in this paper
as follows.
Theorem 6.1. The direct perturbation mechanism preserves ϵ-
differential privacy.
Proof. The direct perturbation mechanism mainly applies
the Laplace mechanism S times sequentially, each of which with the
privacy budget ϵ/S , and then applies the consistency post-process.
Therefore, it is straightforward that the mechanism achieves ϵ-
differential privacy due to the sequential composition and the post-
processing property. □
Theorem 6.2. The threshold perturbation mechanism preserves
ϵ-differential privacy.
Proof. The threshold perturbation mechanism applies the
sparse vector technique and allocates the privacy budget ϵ in two
aspects. The first is comparing with the threshold, which consumes
the budget ϵ1/c at most c times. The second is publishing the his-
tograms with distances greater than the threshold, with the budget
ϵ2/c also at most c times. If there are exactly c times, then the total
privacy budget used is ϵ1/c ×c +ϵ2/c ×c = ϵ . Otherwise, according
to Lines 10 to 13 of Alg. 2, the total privacy budget used is also ϵ .
Therefore, the mechanism preserves ϵ-differential privacy. □
Theorem 6.3. The static hybrid perturbation mechanism pre-
serves ϵ-differential privacy.
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Proof. The static hybrid perturbation mechanism includes
three parts, the time division, the direction perturbation and the
threshold perturbation. The first part is in fact an exponential mech-
anism, and achieves ϵs -differential privacy. The differential privacy
of the other two parts has been analyzed above, thus the two parts
achieve ϵd - and ϵt - differential privacy, respectively. Since the three
parts are sequentially composed, and ϵs+ϵd+ϵt = ϵ , themechanism
achieves ϵ-differential privacy. □
Theorem 6.4. The dynamic hybrid perturbation mechanism
preserves ϵ-differential privacy.
Proof. The dynamic hybrid perturbationmechanism includes
two parts, time division and data perturbation. The first part is the
time divisions for the past H day based on the historical data. We
have assume that the data of each day are independent of each
other, thus this part is the parallel composition of H time divi-
sions of data, each with ϵ-differential privacy, and thus totally also
achieves ϵ-differential privacy. The differential privacy of the sec-
ond part composing three perturbations has been analyzed above,
and they achieve ϵt1-, ϵd - and ϵt2- differential privacy, respec-
tively. Since the three perturbations are sequentially composed,
and ϵt1 + ϵd + ϵt2 = ϵ , the second part achieves ϵ-differential pri-
vacy. Finally, the two parts are parallel composed, and thus the
mechanism achieves ϵ-differential privacy. □
7 EXPERIMENTS
We fully implement the four proposed schemes, direct pertur-
bation (dir-P), threshold perturbation (th-P), static hybrid perturba-
tion (sta-HP) and dynamic hybrid perturbation (dy-HP), and carry
out experiments over two datasets to compare their performances.
In default, we set α = 12. We also use the attack proposed in [25]
to perform trajectory recovery on perturbed aggregated data, and
compare the accuracies of trajectories recovered. We implement
the four schemes in MATLAB. All the experiments are performed
on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6500 CPU 3.20 GHZ and
8GB RAM, running Windows 7.
7.1 Datasets
We conduct our experiment with two datasets. The first dataset
is a real dataset about Taxi-Drive trajectories [26, 27]. The dataset
contains the GPS trajectories of 10,357 taxis in Beijing from Febru-
ary 2 to February 8, 2008. The total number of points in the dataset
is about 15 million, and the total distance of the trajectory reaches 9
million kilometers. The average sampling interval is approximately
177 seconds and the distance is approximately 623 meters. Each file
in the data set (named by the taxi ID) contains the trajectory of a
taxi. Each record in this dataset contains 4 attributes, ID, time, lon-
gitude, and latitude. We divided this region by a grid (500m×500m),
which constitutes a small grid area of about 8000, and counts the
number of taxis per grid every 30 minutes to form aggregate data.
For the second dataset, we simulate and generate a trajectory
dataset for urban crowd movements. According to the literature
[2, 3], the spatial and temporal characteristics of urban population
group activities are as follows. The number of a user’s stays in a
day is very limited, 97.7% of users do not have more than 4 stays,
and the average number of stays per person per day is about 2.1
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Figure 5: Trajectory recovery on two dataset
(maybe home and workplace). At different time periods, there is
a difference in the time durations users stays, and the stay time
durations during the night time are significantly longer than those
during the day. And the rule of crowd movement revealed in the
literature [25]: Each user’s mobile mode has continuity, regularity
and uniqueness. We use the Beijing urban area as the geographical
location to simulate the generation of about 8000 communication
base station locations (500 meters × 500 meters grid). We generate
the initial distribution of 130,000 people based on the characteris-
tics of population distribution. Then, According to the distribution
characteristics and user movement patterns in different time peri-
ods, the track points of each user in continuous time are generated.
Similarly, each record contains four attributes, ID, time, longitude,
and latitude. We select the interval time of 1 hour to aggregate the
user trajectory data for 19 hours. The usability of the simulated
data can be verified by the attack method in [25] later.
7.2 Attack Evaluation
We randomly select 1000 user records from the taxi-drive
dataset and the synthetic dataset, and generate two smaller aggre-
gated mobility datasets. Then we use the attack method proposed
in [25] to perform trajectory recovery experiments on these two
datasets. Fig. 5(a) shows the trajectory recovery on the synthetic
dataset. When there are 10 points on a trajectory, the accuracy of
the trajectory recovery can reach 78.86%. As the number of tra-
jectory points increases, the accuracy decreases, but the average
accuracy can still reach 69.51%. This result is basically consistent
with the experimental conclusions in [25], and this also proves that
the user trajectory dataset generated by our simulation is feasi-
ble in this scheme. Fig. 5(b) shows the trajectory recovery on the
real taxi dataset. When the trajectory of each taxi has 5 trajectory
points, the recovery accuracy can reach 59.4%. The reason why the
trajectory recovery accuracy is lower than that of the synthetic
dataset is that the moving characteristics of taxis lack specific rules
like mobile users. Taxis often run everywhere randomly, while the
moving of mobile users are normally of regularity and uniqueness
characteristics, which are also the basis of the attack method.
We select the synthetic data with 19 trajectory points (whose
recovery accuracy is 61.02% without DP) and the taxi data with 10
trajectory points (whose recovery accuracy is 40.56% without DP),
and compare the performances of trajectory recovery with various
privacy budgets under the proposed schemes. As shown in Fig. 6, the
proposed schemes have the same effect on protecting the aggregated
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Figure 6: Trajectory recovery after DP on two dataset
data from being accurately restored to user trajectories. Especially
on the synthetic dataset, the accuracy of trajectory recovery has
dropped from 61.2% to between 10% and 20%. Besides, the recovery
accuracy has improved with the increase of the privacy budget, but
the effect is not obvious.
7.3 Performance Evaluation
We use Mean Absolute Error(MAE) and Mean Relative Error
(MRE) as the utility metric to evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes. Let X = {x1, · · · ,xt , · · · } denote the raw time
series and Y = {y1, · · · ,yt , · · · } denote the noisy time series. In
addition, let xt = {rt,1, ..., rt,M } and yt = {r ′t,1, ..., r ′t,M } denote
raw aggregated data and noisy aggregated data at time stamp t ,
respectively. The MAE and MRE for this aggregated data at time
stamp t are:
MAE(xt ,yt ) = 1
M
M∑
i=1
|rt,i − r ′t,i | (10)
MRE(xt ,yt ) = 1
M
M∑
i=1
|rt,i − r ′t,i |
max(γ , r ′i )
(11)
For the bound γ , we set its value to 0.001 to avoid the possibility
that the denominator is 0. In our experiments, we first calculate
the MAE and MRE for each aggregated data at each time stamp
and then work out the average of all aggregated data as the final
results.
Utility vs Threshold T. As shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we set
ϵ to 0.8 and compare the utility of four schemes when the threshold
value varies. We let T¯ denote the average of L1 distances for adja-
cent time stamps of the current day. We can see that the data utility
for direction perturbation keeps exactly the same, and that for the
threshold perturbation decreases obviously with the decrease of the
threshold. This is because the direction perturbation is dependent
on the threshold, and for threshold perturbation, when the thresh-
old becomes smaller, more histograms need to be perturbed with
Laplace mechanism, then the privacy budget for each histogram
perturbed is smaller, and finally the noisy added grows higher. Note
that threshold perturbation consume a part of privacy budget for
comparing with the threshold, and the privacy budget for publi-
cation is smaller then that of direct perturbation. We can also see
that the data utility for the improved schemes keep roughly the
same. The reason is that when the threshold becomes small, for the
improved schemes, only the publication of nighttime part can be
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affected, since it uses threshold perturbation. While the nighttime
part is suitable for threshold perturbation, and thus the impact on
data utility is limited.
Utility vs Privacy. As shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we com-
pare MAE and MRE values of the proposed schemes when the
threshold is set T¯ /4, and the privacy budget ϵ changes from 0.1
to 1 on two datasets. Here, T¯ is defined the average of distances
of the current day. We can observe that with the gradual increase
of the privacy budget, the MAE and MRE values of all schemes
are gradually reduced. This accords with the concept of differen-
tial privacy well. As the privacy budget increases, the amount of
noise injected into data decreases, and thus the utility of data rises.
On both synthetic and texi datasets, we can see that the improved
schemes are significantly better than the basic schemes. The main
reason is that the improved schemes can switch between different
perturbation methods according to different moving characteristics,
and always choose the most suitable perturbation method, while
the basic schemes use only one perturbation method throughout
the publication, and the perturbation cannot always suit the moving
characteristics.
Effect of Post Process.We conduct experiments of our schemes
with and without post-process over two dataset to evaluate the
effects of the consistency post-process mechanism. As shown in
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, we compare MAE and MRE values with and
without post-process on the proposed schemes when the privacy
budget ϵ changes from 0.1 to 1. On the synthetic dataset, we can
find that MAE and MRE values with and without post-process are
gradually decreasing as the gradual increase of privacy budget ϵ .
However, the MAE and MRE values with post process are smaller
than those without post-process. On the taxi dataset, this conclu-
sion is similar. In addition, we can find that in the case when the
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Figure 9: Utility vs ϵ on synthetic dataset
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Figure 10: Utility vs ϵ on taxi dataset
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Figure 11: Utility vs ϵ on synthetic dataset
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Figure 12: Utility vs ϵ on taxi dataset
privacy budget is small (eg., ϵ is 0.1), the post-process mechanism
has a significant effect on reducing the error. And as the privacy
budget becomes larger, the effect becomes less obvious. This is
because when the privacy budget ϵ is large, the amount of noise
introduced is small, and the error is also small.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have propose several schemes for differen-
tially private aggregated mobility data publication. We first propose
two basic schemes and a post process mechanism to ensure the data
validity and reduce the data utility, and discuss their drawbacks.
Then, we examine the moving characteristics of mobile users, and
propose two improved schemes for static and dynamic data pub-
lications, respectively, by combining the two basic schemes and
leveraging the moving characteristics. Experimental results on real
and synthetic datasets have shown that by taking advantage of the
moving characteristics of aggregated mobility data, we can greatly
improve the performance of the differentially private data publica-
tion. For the privacy reason, we have not obtained a dataset of real
mobile users, and verified our schemes. We leave this as the future
work.
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